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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that each and every situation encountered was 
entirely new, that a new and unique response was necessary 
for each stimulus. How would one make sense of such an 
environment? A person would possibly be overwhelmed, 
bombarfed by a complex array of stimuli in a complex world. 
Such is not the case, for we have the ability to 
generalize from situation to situation, to treat each 
situation on the basis of previous experiences and prior 
interactions with the environment. This ability allows us 
to learn or form concepts, distinguishing humans from most 
othar forms of life and aiding in simplifying our behavior. 
A concept refers to any regularity of events or 
objects, real or imaginary. Pollio (1974) speaks of a 
concept as that which can be described in terms of a set of 
relevant attributes and a rule that indicates the 
relationship among this set of attributes. It is a group 
of stimuli that have charateristic(s) in common, which are 
then given a category label (Ellis, 1972). For example, 
the United States is not a concept, it is an instance of a 
concept. Similarly, France, England, and Borneo are not 
concepts but rather particular instances of the concept 
•country*. This concept includes these countries as well 
as others, and has various characteristics which accurately 
and precisely define it. 
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To learn a concept implies that a person acquires the 
understanding of the regularity of objects and the 
relationships among these events. That is, a person learns 
to treat events that share certain common properties as 
equivalent or as members of a class. For example, when a 
child is learning the concept of bird, he or she learns to 
classify a variety of specific instances as members of a 
set. The label 'bird' is learned and is applied to a set 
of instances that have particular properties or 
characteristics (i.e. critical features) in common, and 
that are related in a particular way. Obviously, there are 
innumerable concepts to be learned so that new ones are 
being continually acquired. 
The nature of concept learning 
a more formal definition of concept learning was 
provided by Ellis (1972). "Concept learning refers to any 
activity in which the learner must learn to classify two or 
more somewhat different events or objects into a single 
category" (p. 138). The concept has been acquired if one 
can do this accurately and consistently. If, on more than 
one occasion, an individual can make the same response (or 
classification) to stimuli that shara common properties, we 
say that concept learning has occurred. If a child has 
learned the label 'bird', but only applies it to Woody 
Woodpecker of the cartoon strip, then we cannot ascertain 
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that he has learned the concept of bird. He can say that 
the concept has been learned only when the tsra is 
correctly applied to varying specific instances of the 
concept. A child has knowledge of the concept bird when he 
calls a bluebird, robin and magpie each 'bird*. 
Therefore, in order to measure true concept learning, 
new instances of the concept are presented and the 
appropriate classification must follow. For example, if a 
child is to learn the concept round he/she is given an 
orange, a specific instance of the concept, and is told 
that it is a round object. The child may repeat the word 
round when given an orange again, but this does not insure 
that the concept is known. The child may be focusing on 
some irrelevant attribute of the object such as its color, 
texture,- or taste, and not on its shape» In order to sake 
sure that he acquires the concept, one must introduce other 
round objects to the child, such as a ball, a wheel, or a 
balloon, and indicate that they are also round objects. To 
be certain that the concept has been acquired, one must 
present instances of the concept which have not previously 
been seen, as well as to present non-instances of the 
concept, to determine whether or not the person correctly 
rejects these as examples. If the individual can both 
reject non-instances and accept new instances of the 
concept, the inference is that the concept has been 
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learned. For example, when learning the concept •bird', a 
child may be confronted with winged objects such as a 
butterfly, mosquito, or airplane. If these are excluded as 
instances of the concept, one may appropriately infer that 
a correct understanding has been obtained. 
Thus, in order that a person can both select 
appropriate and reject inappropriate instances of a concept 
relevant attributes must be identified and rules learned 
that combine or relate these attributes. It also requires 
ignoring those features of each object that are irrelevent 
to defining the concept. 
Stud2ina_concept_formation 
It is possible to discover what is involved in 
learning concepts through experimental means. A 
description of the laboratory experiEents conducted, the 
details of these situations, as well as what information is 
obtained, follows. A typical study involves stimuli, 
responses, and feedback. That is, examples and 
non-examples of the particular concept are shown to the 
subject (learner). These examples vary on a number of 
dimensions, such as color, number, or position - each 
dimension having two or more levels. That is, the 
dimension of color may have three values or levels; 
purple, orange, and chartreuse. A concept is defined in 
terms of these dimensions, some being relevant to its 
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definition, others being irrelevant. For example, a 
concept may be *two purple objects'. Number and color 
would define a positive instance of this concept, with size 
and shape being irrelevant dimensions. The task of the 
subject is to label a series of items with a single concept 
name, or to say *yes, it is an instance* or 'no, it is not 
an instance* as each example is presented. Feedback 
concerning correctness or incorrectness of the response is 
given by the experimenter, until the subject can accurately 
name the concept or correctly classify numerous successive 
items as being examples or non-examples of the concept. 
Psychologists utilize two primary methods of 
determining and describing concept formation behavior 
(Bourne, Ekstrand, Dominowski, 1971; Ellis, 1972; Pollio, 
1974): These two differ mainly in who determines the 
sequence in which instances of the concept are encountered 
during the experiment, the experimenter or the subject 
himself. Each experimental procedure or paradigm is "a set 
of loose rules for the arrangement of events in an 
experiment" (Bourne et al., 1971). Thus, depending upon 
the study, these rules will vary. The method of 
presentation will be modified to coincide with the purpose 
or goal of the study. 
A common experimental procedure involves the 
experimenter's presenting the stimuli one at a time. The 
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order of presentation in this reception paradigm may be 
random or some predetermined arrangement. The subject 
classifies each object presented as an example of one of a 
set of concepts. If only one concept is involved or being 
learned, each stimulus is classified as either a positive 
or a negative instance of the concept. This response on 
the part of the subject is immediately followed by 
informative feedback. If the classification were 
incorrect, the correct response could be given. Or, this 
informative feedback can be a simple 'yes* or *no* 
concerning accuracy or the correct response itself. 
Usually, one stimulus is presented per trial, followed by a 
response and then feedback. This procedure continues until 
the subject can categorize stimuli without making errors or 
until he/she can give an hypothesis stating the concept. A 
criterion measure that is commonly used concerning 
performance is the number of trials it takes before the 
subject stops making errors (Bourne et al., 1971). 
Two variations on this reception paradigm are found in 
the literature. In one, stimuli are presented to the 
subject individually, one at a time. This is known as 
successive stimulus presentation. Before a new stimulus is 
shown, the preceding one is taken from the subject's view. 
Since such a task is demanding of one's memory, an 
alternative to this method, simultaneous presentation, is 
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often used. In this case, all of the stimuli are laid out 
in an array for the subject to vie*. For each trial, the 
experimenter indicates which stimulus he wants the subject 
to categorize. Cahill and Hovland (1960) found this 
procedure to facilitate concept learning, reducing the 
number of trials to solution. These two possible modes of 
presentation in a reception procedure may appear to be 
rather contrived situations if one considers the normal 
manner in which concepts are learned. An individual is 
typically not passive in acquiring information about 
concepts, nor are instances presented one at a time by 
nature. Hason (1960, 1968) found that an individual 
actively seeks further information to confirm or to reject 
hypotheses. It is common for a subject to search his/her 
environment for appropriate esasples so as to substantiate 
or modify the concepts he/she already has formed and which 
are in his/her repertoire. Such an active search was 
focused upon and employed initially in studies conducted by 
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956). The method they used 
allowed the subjects free choice in determining what 
information was needed in order to be assured that they had 
learned the concept. Such a procedure is appropriately 
labeled the selection paradigm, implying activity on the 
part of each subject. The subject is free from constraints 
placed upon him/her by the experimenter as in the reception 
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paradigm. The set of stimuli is placed before the learner 
from the onset of the experiaent. Typically the 
experimenter designates one exemplar as a positive 
instance, and asks for an hypothesis. For each succeeding 
trial, the subject chooses a stimulus on which he/she wants 
feedback, and the experimenter informs him/her whether it 
is a positive or negative instance of the concept. Again, 
this routine continues until the subject can consistently 
name stimuli correctly as examples of the concept. 
Therefore, the selection procedure allows an individual to 
choose concept instances at his/her own discretion whereas 
subjects in a reception paradigm are at the 'mercy* of the 
experimenter for task information. 
Strategies employed in conceptual behavior 
One of the primary assuaptions psychologists aaJce is 
that human behavior is not random, but rather follows laws 
or rules which can be discovered and delineated. Behavior 
involved in concept formation is no exception. Subjects 
solving conceptual problems display behavior in which 
organization and structure can be found (Bourne et al., 
1971) in spite of the complexity and demands of the task. 
Instead of randomness characterizing an individual's 
approaches to the problem, one finds that hypotheses and 
•strategies' are major guides towards successful 
performance. These aspects of the problem-solver's 
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behavior can be measured and then related to the task 
requireaents and to conditions of the subject as well. 
First of all, one must define what is meant by the 
term 'strategy*, as used in connection with concept 
learning. Pollio (1974) refers to systematic behavior that 
follows some sort of plan as being a strategy. An 
individual is said to follow a strategy if his/her 
responses have an organization that is sequential and leads 
to a solution. The original, pioneering research on 
strategies used by subjects was by Bruner, Goodnow, and 
Austin (1956). A major outcome of their work was that they 
were able to demonstrate that conceptual problem solving 
behavior is highly organized as well as intentional (Bourne 
et al., 1971). Thus, an individual approaches a problem 
solving situation sith the opportunity to systeaaticall? 
and intentionally determine the solution. 
The organized plans of attack and strategies employed 
in concept formation are not idiosyncratic to the 
particular individual but have been found to be 
categorizable. Although Bruner et al. (1956) could not 
determine the strategic approaches of all of their 
subjects, after considerable effort and scrutiny of the 
data, they concluded that most strategies could be 
considered one of two basic types, focusing or scanning. 
Both of these have two variations, yielding four categories 
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of strategies. 
Focusing strategies 
One of these general categories of strategies was 
termed 'focusing'. k positive instance of the concept is 
chosen as a focus. In order to determine the relevant 
attributes of the concept, the subject uses an elimination 
process which compares each instance as it is presented, 
with the chosen focus. An illustration of one type of 
focusing behavior, conservative focusing, may help to 
clarify this strategy. Consider a problem in which the 
selection paradigm is employed. The subject is presented 
an array of cards, some of which are positive incidents of 
the concept, some of which are not. One card is designated 
as an example of the concept. For example, the 
experimenter has designated two (2) , small (S) , green (G) , 
triangles (A) as the exemplar. If a subject uses a 
focusing approach, he will accept this stimulus and all of 
its attributes as a focal point and as possibly relevant to 
the identification of the concept. Therefore, his first 
hypothesis as to the correct concept is 2SG4 . a second 
pattern is then selected, say 2SGO. if the experimenter 
acknowledges that this, too, is a positive instance, the 
subject compares this with the focal point 
(2SGA). This procedure reveals that what differs in these 
two instances is form. Since both patterns are positive 
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instances, form must not be relevant to concept 
identification. Thus, a subject would have as his/her next 
hypothesis 2SG. A third pattern is chosen and is 
2SP (purple). The subject is told that this is not an 
example of the concept, so he compares this choice with the 
focal instance (2SGA) to see what dimension is different. 
Upon comparison, the subject can determine that green must 
be a relevant attribute (the dimension of color) since 
green patterns are positive instances, but not purple ones. 
Therefore, no change in the hypothesis (2SG) is required. 
Such a pattern continues, the subject choosing an example, 
comparing it to the focal instance, and revising the 
hypothesis if necessary, until the subject has all of the 
needed information to determine the concept accurately. 
This illustrates hos the subject's systeaatic behavior 
is determined by the pattern of stimulus choices made and 
the hypotheses formed. When given a positive instance 
initially, he uses this as a focus and develops a 
hypothesis based upon all of the characteristics of this 
pattern. A series of decisions is made which either 
confirms or eliminates an aspect of the stimulus as 
relavant to the concept. Each 'updated* stimulus choice 
varies on only one dimension at a time from the focus. 
This approach, labeled conservative focusing (Bruner et 
al., 1956), permits attributes to be checked individually 
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for relevance and insures that each trial will provide some 
information leading to the concept solution. 
Subjects also utilize a form of focusing that is more 
reckless, less restricted, Pollio (1974) points out that 
if cards are randomly presented, conservative focusing may 
not be possible, and focus gambling could be employed. The 
first card presented again serves as the focus, but instead 
of modifying only one attribute at a time, the subject 
changes more than one single attribute with each choice of 
cards. 
Recall once again, the example in which the initial 
focus is the stimulus 2SG A. The second pattern chosen by 
the subject may be 2LGO , a stimulus which differs on two 
attributes (size and form), yet which is designated as a 
positive instance. Thus, when compared with the focus, the 
subject learns that size and form are irrelevant to the 
concept and thus comes to the solution more rapidly. Being 
less conservative, in this case, has paid-off and the 
number of trials needed to achieve a solution is reduced. 
Pollio (1974) speaks of this as an advantage since it is 
possible for an individual to jump to a correct conclusion 
with reduced time and trouble. However, greater risks may 
also characterize such an approach. If the second stimulus 
that was chosen as an example (2LGO) were a negative 
instance, the subject would compare this to the focus and 
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notice that size (small), form (triangle), or both could be 
relevant dimensions. This tfould require sore selections to 
determine which is the case, changing one attribute at a 
time and thus increasing the total number of trials needed 
to determine the concept. This strategy, potentially 
riskier, is appropriately termed focus gambling. 
Scanning strategies 
The second basic classification of concept-solving 
strategies resembles what Ellis (197 2) refers to as 
scanning, a hypothesis selection and testing approach. 
Theories revolving around scanning behavior emphasize the 
activity of the learner in selecting, testing, and 
rejecting or accepting potential solutions. Bruner et al. 
(1956) observed that many individuals do not use a focal 
instance by shich they determine relevant and irrelevant 
attributes of the stimuli. Instead, many individuals 
apparently form a hypothesis as to what they think the 
solution is and categorize the stimuli with respect to this 
hypothesis. Stimuli are chosen to test the generated 
hypotheses. When a stimulus is picked as though it were a 
positive instance and the subject is told that it is not 
correct, the hypothesis is then revised. This general 
approach is labeled scanning. Again, two variations of 
this strategy have been delineated. If a subject develops 
a specific hypothesis on the basis of the initial card 
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chosen and then attempts to confirm or disconfirm the 
hypothesis being considered by gathering evidence, he/she 
is using a successive scanning approach. For example, a 
subject in the previous example has developed the 
hypothesis that 'two circles' is the appropriate concept. 
The next stimuli chosen are picked in accordance with this 
hypothesis, until a negative instance is encountered, at 
which time the hypothesis is modified. Such a method has 
the advantage of lessening memory strain since only the 
present hypothesis must be remembered at any particular 
moment. This is in contrast to what is termed simultaneous 
scanning. In this approach, an individual is thought to 
consider all of the possible hypotheses at the same time. 
Each card choice is an attempt to eliminate those 
hypotheses which are incorrect. Such a strategy would tax 
one's memory and thus be a difficult undertaking (Pollio, 
1974) . 
Scanning is not as economical or efficient as focusing 
strategies (Laughlin and Jordan, 1967; Laughlin, 1975). It 
is not as systematic an approach to determining the 
relevant concept attributes. Often times, successive 
scanning produces errors, since certain aspects of 
hypotheses that were disconfirmed in prior choices may be 
included in the concept currently being considered. 
Therefore, a subject may reconsider dimensions which have 
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already been rejected. One's memory of all the previously 
tested hypotheses may fail, leading to redundant selection 
and testing. In the simultaneous scanning situation, it is 
also necessary that an individual keep in mind those 
hypotheses that are still tenable. It is not difficult to 
see that an individual's memory may be taxed when one 
considers the limitations that characterize a human mind. 
Focusing approaches allow a type of bookkeeping system. On 
each trial the subject has to recall only one stimulus 
which represents a certain group of attributes. This card 
is revised continuously, based upon successes or failures 
on previous trials and on what is left to be tested. 
Focusing and scanning strategies have been delineated 
as a result of studies employing selection paradigms. 
There is a question as to whether or not similar strategies 
are used in situations in which the subject does not have a 
free choice as to what the next stimulus will be (reception 
paradigms). In these situations, the experimenter presents 
the instances in a predetermined order. Levine (1966) has 
described a variation of focusing which has been observed 
in the concept formation behavior of individuals having no 
control over order of presentation. The first positive 
instance presented by the experimenter is used as a 
•focus'. A working hypothesis is created on the basis of 
this instance's attributes. Each successively shown 
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stimulus is compared with this focus and a subject 
eventually determines the concept. Such a strategy is 
called vholist or wholist focusing. This strategy is 
difficult to follow since the presentation of stimuli may 
be random, not following any particular order. Or, this 
order may not be what the subject would prefer to test. 
However, an attempt is made to create an hypothesis which 
encompasses those attributes which may still be relevant to 
the concept, utilizing a focus as in a selection paradigm. 
The use of scanning strategies also has been suggested 
(Levine, 1966) in reception paradigms. Here, based upon 
some attribute of the first positive instance given, 
subjects develop an hypothesis and ignore other potential 
hypotheses. This is termed a partist strategy. In either 
case, it is difficult to determine if a strategy is used 
consistently, since the experimenter has control of the 
situation. Such a circumstance does not allow for a 
crucial component of concept formation, the subject's own 
selection of stimuli from the domain of possibilities. 
Therefore, it is a challenge to the experimenter to make 
statements concerning strategies the subject uses, if any. 
Factors that influence concept attainment 
As a result of these conceptual strategies, an 
individual eventually discovers the concept under 
consideration. Such concept formation varies in difficulty 
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of attainment. The ease and rapidity by which a particular 
concept is learned is greatly affected by aspects of the 
situation in which the instances are presented, as well as 
characteristics of the concept itself. These can be 
included under the topic of task variables. 
One condition which may affect the speed of concept 
attainment is the presentation of positive or negative 
instances, or both. This issue considers the nature of the 
instances presented (Ellis, 1972). Typically, when 
learning about a concept, both positive and negative 
instances are dealt with. It is thought that since we are 
mora likely to encounter positive instances, we should 
learn more guickly from positive examples of the concept. 
Early studies (Smoke, 1933) supported this view that there 
is an advantage in presenting positive instances, while 
making less use of negative instances. Although negative 
instances were considered to have some merit, these studies 
indicated that their primary advantage was for providing a 
background or context for evaluating the positive 
instances. It was pointed out by Hovland (1952) that the 
negative instances usually do not contain much information 
as to the nature of the concept. Subjects may learn less 
from negative examples because there is less to be learned 
from them. Hovland and Seiss (1953) investigated this idea 
by equating negative and positive instances with respect to 
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their information load. They demonstrated that negative 
instances do provide enough information to identify 
concepts, but also that positive instances are more 
efficiently used by individuals, k direct relationship 
between overall efficiency of performance and the 
percentage of positive examples also lends support to the 
idea that positive instances are more beneficial to rapid 
concept formation (Schvaneveldt, 1966). 
Such results are understandable when one considers how 
we typically learn concepts. Rarely are they formed in 
everyday life through negative instances alone. Knowing 
that something is 'not-X' only helps us if there is a small 
number of hypotheses possible. But, in general, this does 
not help rule out other possible concepts (Pollio, 1974). 
Bruner; Goodnow. and Austin (1956) suggested that the 
majority of educational processes, both natural and formal, 
are built around examples of what a concept *is* , rather 
than what it 'is not*. When teaching a young child what a 
tree is, an individual wou'd point out to him positive 
examples, such as oaks, maples and junipers, not negative 
exemplars such as traffic lights, automobiles, and dogs. 
Since real-life situations are like this, it is not 
surprising that positive instances presented during concept 
formation experiments are easier to learn from than are 
negative examples. Freiberg and Tulving (1961), however. 
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demonstrated that with practice or with training at using 
negative instances, only slight differences in speed and 
efficiency of concept formation were noticed between this 
group and those given only positive instances. It is as 
yet difficult conclusively to state that with practice 
humans will be as able to utilize negative instances as 
positive instances, other results (Mason, 1961a, 1961b) 
found subjects almost never try to negate an hypothesis, 
but prefer to confirm it, even after extended practice with 
negative instances. For whatever reason, subjects prefer 
positive instances when forming concepts. 
A second task characteristic to consider in concept 
formation problems is the saliency or distinctiveness of 
the dimensions since some properties of the stimuli are 
mors obvxous than ethers, U^sens^cnal sal%sncy 3.s ïseasured 
by the frequency with which particular dimensions are 
chosen as the basis for categorization of stimuli. Such a 
factor was found to influence learning (Zelniker, 
Oppenheimer, Benan, 1975). Concept identification was 
achieved more rapidly when the preferred (most salient) 
dimension was necessary, or relevant, to solve the concept 
than when it was irrelevant (Johnson, iarner, and Silleroy, 
1971; Odom and Mumbauer, 1972). This occurred especially 
with children as subjects. Odom and Mumbauer (1972) found 
that although the dimensions which are most and least 
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salient (i.e. the hierarchy of dimensional saliency) may 
change with development, the relative salience of a 
dimension is negatively associated with response time and 
number of errors on identity tasks. Younger children tend 
to learn color concepts more readily than form concepts 
(Bourne and Restle, 1959), with number and position being 
less salient than form or color (Zelniker et al., 1975). 
At this age, if number or position were relevant to 
determination of the concept, speed and accuracy would be 
negatively affected. Therefore, acquisition of a concept 
will be influenced by the saliency (for that subject) of 
the relevant dimensions. 
When defining any concept, certain dimensions are 
relevant to its description while others are not. The 
nusber of these relevant and/or irrelevant dimensions 
obviously will influence the speed and difficulty of 
concept acquisition. One question dealing with this aspect 
has concerned how the efficiency of concept attainment is 
affected when the number of relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions varies or is high. It has been quite well 
established that performance (e.g. number of trials to 
solution) is linearly related to the complexity of the 
concept, the number of relevant dimensions (Archer, Bourne, 
& Brown, 1955; Bulgarella and Archer, 1962; Schvaneveldt, 
1966; Frederick and Klausmeier, 1968). Time and trials to 
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solution as well as errors increase when number of 
irrelevant dimensions increases (Bulgarella and Archer, 
1962). These results have been found over a wide range of 
complexity (concepts with one or more than one dimension) 
and types of conceptual principles - conjunctive, 
disjunctive, biconditional (Haygood and Stevenson, 1967; 
Kspros and Bourne, 1966). Frederick and Klausmeier (1968) 
demonstrated that when the total number of dimensions is 
held constant and the proportion of relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions is varied, the difficulty becomes a function of 
the number of relevant dimensions, not the number of 
irrelevant dimensions. For example, a concept that has 
three relevant and two irrelevant dimensions will be more 
difficult to learn than one with two relevant and three 
irrelevant diasnsions* To solve for a concept; the 
individual must test the variable dimensions for their 
relevance. Testing for each dimension will usually take a 
certain fixed number of trials, with an increase in the 
number of relevant attributes to contend with, there is 
more information to reduce or condense, increasing the task 
difficulty. 
& final aspect of the task which must be considered as 
potentially affecting the ease of concept formation is the 
method of stimulus presentation. The two most commonly 
used procedures - reception and selection - were previously 
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described. These two paradigms have been compared with 
respect to ease of coBcept formation bat results depend 
upon a variety of factors, thus the data are not clear. 
Age differences appear in the literature. Hunt (1965) 
found that adults perform better (i.e. quicker concept 
attainment) when given their own selection of stimuli as 
opposed to experimenter-imposed stimulus presentation. In 
contrast, reception procedures appeared more efficient for 
young children than a selection strategy (Huttenlocher, 
1962). Results are not definitive, since other studies 
(Murray and Gregg, 1969; Laughlin, 1972; Smalley, 1974) 
have found superior performance using a reception paradigm 
(and adult subjects). However, this may occur when the 
complexity of the concept is increased, Flaherty and 
Flaherty (197%) and Laughlin (1975) found that perforsance 
seems to be relatively better using selection paradigms 
when learning conjunctive concepts (e.g. every flower which 
is yellow and has four petals is an example). On more 
difficult concepts (disjunctive or conditional), the 
reception paradigm appears to aid performance more so than 
selection procedures, (An example of a conditional concept 
is: 'If a flower is yellow, then it must have four 
petals,* 'Every flower which is yellow or has four petals 
or both', is an example of a disjunctive concept) . 
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Selection paradigms increase the demands on attention, 
yet for adults (in conjunctive concept situations) produce 
more rapid concept attainment than reception paradigms. 
Those individuals with characteristically longer attention 
spans and more highly developed strategies may readily 
adapt to a selection procedure and be successful at it. 
Younger children and those who employ less mature 
strategies would not perform as well under these demanding 
conditions. Thus, they should benefit from a paradigm 
which utilizes a reception technique for concept formation. 
As the task becomes increasingly more difficult 
(disjunctive or conditional rules), however, it may be 
necessary for the experimenter to present the stimulus 
instances since the memory load would be too great - for 
old and young subjects alike. 
Individual learner characteristics -
slow/accurate-fast/inaccurate 
The factors just mentioned which influence concept 
formation were task or situation variables that are 
external to the subject himself/herself. The ease or 
difficulty of concept acquisition is not solely a function 
of these characteristics. Rather, attributes of the person 
learning the concepts also will partially determine how 
quickly and efficiently they are acquired and the 
strategies used in the process. Such things as attitudes. 
2H 
motivation, abilities, and learning 'styles' are classified 
as learner variables, having relevance to concept 
formation. People differ in their overall efficiency when 
solving problems or learning something new, iny experiment 
will have a wide range of scores revealing differing levels 
of performance on the tasks involved. What characteristics 
the individual possesses which produce these differences 
and the various styles of approach to the problems are not 
easily discovered. However, individual differences 
consistently occur and do have relevance to concept 
formation studies, thus are worth the emphasis. 
A term that has been coined to refer to persistent 
individual differences in modes of behavior and thought is 
cognitive style. The various patterns of perceiving, 
memorizing, organizing, and utilizing the stimuli presented 
are a few of the aspects of an individual's cognitive 
style. In any educational or learning situation, these 
dispositions may partially determine the extent of 
learning, the ease of concept acguisition, possibly the 
effectiveness of the instructional method. Bourne et al. 
(1971) refer to cognitive styles as ways to achieve 
intellectual goals. These styles are general enough to 
characterize much of an individual's activity and can 
distinguish one individual from another individual who is 
attempting to achieve the same goal. 
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One disposition which has implications for learning is 
the individual's tendency to be either slow and accurate or 
fast and inaccurate. An individual may reflect on his/her 
cognitive products and their quality prior to making a 
response or judgment, or he may answer impulsively, 
accepting an early response (Kagan, 1965a). Research 
dealing with this cognitive dimension has focused on error 
rate and on the time it takes to make a response (response 
latency) in situations that involve response uncertainty. 
The task most frequently employed to measure this style is 
the Matching Familiar Figures (HFF) test. This task 
requires that the individual choose the one figure from 
among sir alternatives that he/she thinks is identical to 
the standard, since these choices are all exceedingly 
similar, the difficulty of the task is rather high. 
Measures are made of the time an individual takes to make 
his or her first response as well as the total number of 
errors on each trial. 
In numerous studies on such visual matching tasks, a 
negative correlation, on the average approximately -.55, 
has been found between response time and the number of 
errors made (Kagan and Messer, 1975; Ault, Mitchell, S 
Hartmann, 1976; Sola and Phye, 1976) . Impulsive 
individuals (fast/inaccurates) are those who show short 
response latencies prior to responding while making 
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numerous mistakes overall. It is possible that they act on 
the first hypothesis generated without considering its 
'goodness* or inappropriateness. Those who display the 
opposite tendencies on such tasks are considered 
slow/accurates (reflective). They take more time to 
analyze the situation as well as make less frequent errors 
in responding. In any sample, those scoring both below the 
sample median on response latency and above the sample 
median on errors are deemed fast/inaccarates, those 
individuals scoring above this median on response latency 
as well as below the median on errors are defined as 
slow/accurates. Consequently, this concept of cognitive 
tempo, although consistent within the individual, is 
relative in nature since the latency and error medians 
depend upon each sample involved. 
Cognitive approaches of slow/accurates and 
fast/inaccurates 
Data have shown that slow/accurate individuals are 
predisposed to search for subelements within a stimulus 
situation and to split up the total situation analytically 
(Lee, Kagan, and Rabson, 1963). These findings occur when 
the subject is asked to look for similarities between 
objects that are within larger stimulus contexts, Kagan, 
Moss, and Sigel (1963) found that such kinds of analytic 
responses were associated with longer response times. This 
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led to the prediction that those who were analytic towards 
the stimuli aay be less impulsive in other test situations 
as well. Kagan (1965b) studied the effect of analytic 
attitudes on reading errors and found that response time 
and the number of head-eye fixations (the number of times 
the head and eyes moved up to study the standard before the 
first hypothesis was elicited) correlated highly. This 
suggested that the alternative answers were being actively 
considered during the interval prior to the emission of the 
first response. 
A few studies have probed further into the observing 
behavior and eye movements of fast/inaccurates and 
slow/accurates in order to delineate the differences in 
cognitive approaches on a HFF task (Kagan, Pearson, and 
Sslch, 1365b; Sigslaan, 1969; Drake, 1970). Generally, 
fast/inaccurates were found to ignore more alternatives and 
to look more globally at the standard. They apparently 
were not critical when evaluating the quality of their 
answers. Fast/inaccurate college subjects were found by 
Drake (1970) to observe the standard for a greater 
proportion of the time, and to look less precisely at the 
choices. Slow/accurates, however, were shown to frequently 
recheck all the alternatives during the course of the task. 
The proportion of the time devoted to the standard was 
less for slow/accurates than for the fast/inaccurates. The 
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reason suggested for this difference was that the 
slow/accurates tended to analytically study the 
alternatives and then compare them with the standard. 
These results would suggest that by modifying only response 
time, performance would not also necessarily improve but 
that their cognitive approaches must be considered. 
Studies (Kagan, Pearson, and Welch, 1966a; Reali and 
Hall, 1970; lando and Kagan, 1968) have shown that the 
error rate on HFF items is not lowered by training 
fast/inaccurates in lengthening their response time alone. 
However, training procedures that teach fast/inaccurate 
children information processing skills that are more 
efficient than those they originally use have been 
generally successful in improving performance (Ridberg, 
Parke, and Hetherington. 1971: Egelariu, 1S7S). For 
example, Egeland (1974) designed a training procedure that 
would teach fast/inaccurate children to break stimuli down 
into component parts, to look at the segments of each 
alternative, and then to check the standard to determine if 
the segments correctly match the standard. An increase in 
response time and decrease in errors on the MFF was found 
immediately after training, as well as on post-tests given 
two months later. Failures of studies modifying only 
response time and successes of those focusing on the 
cognitive approaches, indicates that emphases in research 
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might well be placed on the cognitive strategies used by 
individuals as well as on attentional characteristics. 
There is some information that suggests few differences 
between slow/accurates and fast/inaccurates with regards to 
basic perceptual processing (Ault, Crawford, and Jeffrey, 
1972; Odom and Mumbauer, 1972), Rather, the differences 
may be due to attention-sustaining deficiencies (Reiner, 
1975). Zelniker, Jeffrey, Ault, and Parsons (1972) 
compared slow/accurates and fast/inaccurates on the HFF and 
the DFF (a task on which the subjects find the figure that 
is different than the standard). They found that with a 
modification of the task, the scanning strategies of the 
fast/inaccurates were modified. These modifications were 
maintained on a HFF task given later. Their suggestion was 
that a change in motivation in the fast/inaccurate subjects 
occurred, increasing attention and thus improving task 
performance. 
Reiner and Berzonsky (1975) demonstrated that 
slow/accurate sixth graders showed less incidental and more 
central learning than fast/inaccurates. Central learning 
refers to the ability to pay attention to the principal 
aspects of the task at hand. This involves selective 
attention. The individual concentrates more exclusively on 
(thus recalls) the primary task features. In the case of 
incidental learning, a greater amount of irrelevant 
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features and details are attended to and remembered, 
indicating nonselectivity. Hith age, a child becomes more 
capable of directing attention to the central aspects of a 
task, whereas the amount of incidental learning does not 
change (Hagen and Hale, 1973). This suggests that sixth 
grade slow/accurates were beginning to use selection 
strategies that fast/inaccurates did not. Fast/inaccurates 
may have difficulty attending selectively because of 
problems in distinguishing relevant from irrelevant cues, 
thus inflating their incidental learning scores and 
lowering central learning. Such attentional difficulties 
may lead them to try to remember all the cues, since they 
are not as efficient in determining which are the important 
cues, thereby hampering learning, 
Aside fro2 attentional aspects, recent studies have 
dealt with the question of how cognitive strategies of 
fast/inaccurates and slow/accurates differ and what 
repercussions a particular strategy may have for the 
individual. Results of a study by Bush and Dweck (1975) 
suggested that slow/accurates could not only respond 
cautiously when the situation required, but could adapt to 
the demands of the task. Utilizing three tests that 
stressed quick decision-making, they found that 
slow/accurates (as classified on the MFF) were no slower 
than fast/inaccurates on these tasks. They were oftentimes 
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faster and their error rates were lover. That is, 
siow/accurates were able to respond quickly and accurately 
when the need arose. They demonstrated a flexible approach 
by utilizing strategies that apparently took into account 
current task requirements. Such results suggest 
flexibility of strategies on the part of the slow/accurate 
(reflective) individual which would aid this person on a 
variety of learning tasks, yielding greater efficiency. 
Exploration of problem-solving behavior of fast/inaccurate 
and slow/accurate individuals 
Several techniques have been recently developed and 
used which allow for the investigation of problem-solving 
strategies. These procedures present the subject a problem 
which has a finite number of solutions. The task is to 
discover the correct solution by gathering information 
which eliminates alternatives that are incorrect. McKinney 
(1973) presented fast/inaccurate and slow/accurate second 
grade subjects a matrix solution task in order to assess 
their problem solving strategies. They were shown a matrix 
of flowers which varied on three dimensions. The correct 
flower was to be discovered by asking questions that could 
be answered yes or no. The findings indicated that more 
information was obtained from the questions of 
slow/accurate subjects than from those questions asked by 
fast/inaccurates. The slow/accurates also used a focusing 
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strategy more frequently while fast/inaccurates tended to 
process information in a trial-and-error manner. In other 
studies (Ault, et al., 1972; Denney, 1973), twenty-question 
games were used and again slow/accurate children asked 
questions which provided more relevant information than did 
fast/inaccurates. Also, the strategic approaches utilized 
by the younger slow/accurates were comparable to those used 
by older fast/inaccurate children. Neussle (1972) showed 
that slow/accurates were more proficient in concept 
formation tasks, demonstrating that there was a similarity 
in the focusing behavior of slow/accurates who were in the 
fifth grade and fast/inaccurates who were in the ninth 
grade. It appears that the level of development of 
strategies for problem-solving differs in these groups of 
children. Recently, ScKinney (1975) presented seven, nine, 
and eleven year old fast/inaccurates and slow/accurates a 
series of five problem solving tasks, increasing in 
difficulty. Results again supported the suggestion that 
cognitive tempo influences strategic approaches and 
therefore efficiency. The greatest impact upon the 
problem-solving behavior occurred in the seven and eleven 
year olds, and less so with the nine year olds. 
Slow/accurate children at the seven year old level 
displayed a higher incidence of focusing behavior than 
fast/inaccurates on three of the five tasks. They also 
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were more systematic when testing hypotheses. 
Fast/inaccarate seven year olds were not likely to fora 
abstract hypotheses, but instead, used a trial-and-error 
strategy to process task information. Of further interest 
was the finding that slow/accurate subjects showed 
continued improvement between nine and eleven years of age 
on a pattern matching task and pictures problem. However, 
fast/inaccurates showed minimal gains, if any, in their 
problem-solving efficiency on these tasks. Nine-year-old 
children were very similar, regardless of the cognitive 
tempos, but by eleven years of age, slow/accurates 
displayed a significant increase in focusing behavior on 
these tasks, while fast/inaccurate children continued to 
utilize a mixed strategies approach. 
Goals of this study 
This review of the literature suggests that 
slow/accurates and fast/inaccurates (as measured by the 
HFF) differ in the use of sophisticated, time-consuming 
strategies, potentially affecting the efficiency of concept 
formation. It was hypothesized that the optimal strategy 
is adopted earlier by slow/accurate individuals and that 
they use a focusing approach in a great number of problem 
situations, thus solving them in fewer trials than do 
fast/inaccurates. The goal of this study was to obtain 
information concerning the efficiency of the strategic 
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approaches of slow/accarates and fast/inaccurates on a 
concept formation task. By varying the age level (testing 
fourth and sixth graders) age differences in performance 
were analyzed and levels of development compared. If 
slow/accurates and fast/inaccurates do differ in the 
maturity of strategy usage, such a developmental study 
would provide indications of the differential efficiency of 
their particular strategy at varying ages. It was 
predicted that slow/accurate fourth graders would perform 
similar to sixth graders of a fast/inaccurate style. 
Hypotheses concerning differential criterion 
performance under selection and reception paradigms were 
developed. A selection condition, in which an individual 
is left to his or her own devices or strategies may allow 
for superior performance on the part of older subjects 
and/or slow/accurate subjects. It is suggested that these 
individuals have more highly developed, therefore 
efficient, strategies. If it is the case that 
fast/inaccurate individuals do not employ well-developed 
strategies, a reception condition presenting concept 
instances in an optimal manner may be more beneficial to 
their performance than a selection condition. This would 
also be expected if fast/inaccurates have attentional 
deficiencies. A concept formation task demanding more from 
one's attention (i.e. a selection paradigm) should produce 
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superior performance on the part of those who can direct 
their attention to the task at hand, additionally, by 
instructing subjects to utilize a focusing approach, it was 
predicted that deficiencies in strategy usage would be 
corrected (if these instructions are heeded). It was 
hypothesized that those subjects given such instructions 
would perform better on the concept formation task under 
consideration. It was suggested that subjects not as 
mature in their strategies would benefit more from 
instructions than those already using focusing or mixed 
approaches. 
Assumptions were that if this dimension of cognitive 
style were a generalized characteristic of an individual, 
the latency of response on the MFF task should be related 
to latencies on an attention task. also, if deficiencies 
in attention deployment are characteristic of 
fast/inaccurate individuals (as measured by the MFF), such 
an attention task should reflect these possible 
differences. Thus, it was hypothesized that there should 
be a correlation between a measure of latency on an 
attention task and latency as measured by the MFF. 
Differences in average latency for fast/inaccurates and 
slow/accurates were expected as well. 
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METHOD 
Sabiects 
Eighty-two subjects were selected from the fourth and 
sexth grade classes at the Gilbert, Iowa, Community School. 
The mean ages for the fourth and sixth grade classes were 
10.6 and 12.6 years, respectively. There were 20 females 
and 20 males in the fourth grade sample and 25 females and 
17 males in the sixth grade sample. Fourth and sixth 
graders were randomly drawn from the classroom and randomly 
assigned to the experimental groups. All were administered 
the Hatching Familiar Figures (MFF) task and the Attention 
Diagnostic Method (ADM), as well as a concept formation 
task. Initially, all subjects were individually given the 
MFF and the ADM. Within two weeks, they were presented 
with a concept foraaticn task under one of four conditions: 
(1) Reception-No instructions; (2) 
Beception-Instructions; (3) Selection-No instructions; 
and (4) Selection-Instructions. Approximately twenty 
subjects were in each condition - ten from each grade. The 
dependent measure obtained from this task was the average 
number of trials to reach the criterion of four consecutive 
correct responses. 
Materials 
The Matching Familiar Figures (MFF) test, as developed 
by Kagan (1963), was used to obtain a measure of each 
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subject's conceptual tempo. As a means by which 
attentional aspects of an individual's behavior can be 
assessed, as well as a construct validation device, the 
Attention Diagnostic Method (ADM) was administered. This 
technique, developed by J. B. Block (1975) was used to 
identify those individuals who show failures of attention. 
When performing this task, the subject sat facing a display 
board that had the numbers 10 to 36 painted upon it, 
arranged in a random order. Each number was painted one of 
five bright colors - red, yellow, black, blue, or green. 
The subject was to locate the digits in numerical order and 
name both the number and its color. For example, the 
subject would say "Ten-green, eleven-blue, twelve-white" 
and so on. The time required to locate each number was 
recorded on a strip recorder. Thus, as in the SFF. a 
measure of latency was obtained for each response. It was 
advantageous to utilize this instrument since it gives an 
indication of attention over a period of time -
twenty/-five data points are recorded. ADM latency was 
compared with performance on the MFF - a validation of this 
reflection-impulsivity task. It was expected that if 
reflection-impulsivity (slow/accurate vs. fast/inaccuate 
behavior) is a general characteristic of the individual's 
style, similar performance should be found on this task, 
also an attention-sustaining task. 
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The materials for the concept formation task were 3 X 
2 inch cards containing figures which differed in four 
respects; 1) in shape, 2) in color, 3) in namber, and 
U) in size. The shapes involved were squares, circles, and 
crosses. There were one, two, or three figures on each 
card, varying in color - blue, green, or red. Sizes of 
these objects were small (1/2"), medium (1"), and large (1 
1/2"). These concept cards were arranged in an orderly 
fashion on a large board. This stimulus board was in full 
view of each subject throughout the experiment. Concepts 
are listed in Appendix A. 
Procedure 
A counter-balanced design was employed. In the first 
session one-half of the students were administered the 
Hatching Familiar Figures test for reflection-iapulsivity 
prior to performing the ADM. The typical procedures and 
instructions for administration of this test were used. 
Following the MFF administration these subjects were tested 
on the Attention Diagnostic Method (ADM), according to its 
usual administration procedures. The remainder of the 
subjects were initially given the ADM followed by the MFF. 
During the second session, presentation of the concept 
formation task occurred. The task given was based upon 
that used by Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin in their initial 
(1956) work on concept attainment. Each subject was 
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presented a large board containing the array of 81 cards. 
A geoastric figure was contained on each card. Figures 
vera arranged in an orderly manner with all cards of the 
same shape or color together, as well as the same number or 
size. This orderliness was to eliminate the difficulty a 
subject may have had when choosing one card for testing. 
Each subject was told that each figure was a 
combination of four attributes. They were informed that 
each attribute had three levels but that only one level of 
each could be on a card. The subject was told that the 
experimenter was thinking of a particular concept and that 
his or her task was to determine what the concept was. 
Subjects also were instructed that each concept was a 
combination of two of the attributes, a conjunctive 
concept, and that two attributes were irrelevant to its 
definition. The concept may have been a combination of one 
level of color (red) and one level of number (2) . Thus, 
the concept would have been *two red objects' with size and 
shape as non-determiners. Initially, the subject was shown 
a particular card that exemplified the concept the 
experimenter had in mind. This was considered a positive 
instance of the concept. 
In addition to a thorough description of the task, 
subjects also received an explanation of the meaning of a 
concept. Instructions were as follows: "In this task you 
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will have to figure out what concept I am thinking of. A 
concept is how you can group things in ways that they are 
the same." They were then given examples cf concepts, such 
as *dog', as well as examples such as were included on the 
task (all cards with blue crosses, for example). To 
ascertain that they understood what a concept was, they 
were given a number of concept names and told to point to 
examples of these on the array of cards. Instructions can 
be found in Appendix B. 
Under the selection condition, subjects were informed 
that their task was to point to cards, one at a time, which 
were considered by them to be examples of the concept-
Following each choice, the experimenter told the subject 
whether the card chosen was a positive or a negative 
example of the concept. For the reception condition, the 
experimenter first pointed to an example of the concept, 
indicating that it was a positive instance. The 
experimenter then continued to point to cards and the 
subject's task was to indicate whether or not he or she 
considered it to be an example of the concept. Under this 
situation the experimenter pointed to cards in an optimal 
manner - using essentially a conservative focusing 
approach. Each card pointed to varied from the first card 
(focus) on only one attribute. Subjects were given an 
indication of the new focus card each time it was changed. 
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In the instructions condition, subjects were informed 
of the optimal manner by which one could solve the problem 
- that is, a focusing approach. Those receiving 
instructions while under the selection condition were told 
to use the first positive example pointed to by the 
experimenter as a focus. They were told hew to vary each 
of the following card choices one attribute at a time from 
this focus card, in order to determine the relevant 
attributes. If subjects were in the reception condition, 
and receiving instructions, they were told that the 
experimenter would be varying one attribute at a time from 
the focus card, and that it would be most efficient to note 
the attribute that was varied and whether or not this 
attribute was relevant to defining the concept. Practice 
and examples of a focusing strategy were given to each 
subject under both instruction conditions. 
Each subject was individually tested with the array of 
cards in full view at all times. Immediate feedback was 
given as to whether each choice was an exemplar or 
non-exemplar of the concept. Eight concepts were 
presented in the task. Approximately ten subjects from 
both grades were in each of the four conditions. 
During the course of concept attainment, in the 
selection conditions, the experimenter recorded the 
examples chosen by each subject, in the order that they 
42 
were picked. In the reception condition, as the 
experimenter pointed to a card, the correctness of each 
response made by the subject was recorded. Criterion for 
all conditions was four consecutive correct responses. To 
insure that the subject knew the concept, he or she was 
also required to tell what he thought the concept was after 
criterion level was reached. Subjects either had to 
correctly select four examples of the concept consecutively 
or accurately respond as the experimenter pointed to 
examples or non-examples of the concept. If a subject 
could not verbalize the concept, he/she continued selecting 
examples until the concept was correctly identified. 
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BESOLTS 
The dependent measure obtained from the concept 
formation task and used in the regression analysis was the 
mean number c£ trials a subject needed to achieve the 
criterion of four consecutive correct responses. Before 
this average could be used as the dependent variable, it 
was necessary to demonstrate that there were no 
interactions between concepts and the treatment or learner 
variables. A 2 (presentation mode) X 2 (instructions) X 2 
(grade) repeated measures analysis of variance was 
performed and indicated that while performance varied 
significantly over the eight concepts, F (7,518) = 7.76, 
£<.001, no interactions were significant. Table 1 presents 
a summary of the findings. That some concepts were more 
readily learned than others is not surprising. Of 
importance in this analysis, however, was that all 
subjects, regardless of the condition or grade they were 
in, showed similar patterns of performance over the trials. 
So interactions with respect to the repeated measures were 
significant, thus it was considered appropriate to average 
the number of trials to criterion over the concepts and to 
use this measure as the dependent variable in further 
analyses. 
Independent variables included three classification 
variables (presentation mode, instructions, and grade) as 
TABLE_1 
Analysis of Variance summary Table for Dependent Variable; 
Repeated Measures 
Soyrcg df MgaB.Sguare 
Presentation Mode 
Instructions 
Grade 
Presentation X 
Presentation X 
Presentation X 
Subjects 
Instructions 
Grade 
Instructions X Grade 
E (Repeated Measures) 
Presentation X E 
Instructions X E 
Grade X e 
Presentation X 
Presentation X 
Instructions X 
Presentation X 
Subjects X E 
•£<702 
••£<. 001 
Instructions 
Grade X E 
Grade X E 
Instructions 
X e 
X Grade X E 
518 
816.33 
110.21 
20.58 
269.48 
106.88 
131.28 
141.30 
386.31 
51.87 
55.96 
77.30 
54.60 
45.40 
35.60 
28.91 
5.66* 
0.76 
0.14 
1.87 
0.74 
0.91 
7.79** 
1.05 
1.13 
1.56 
1.10 
0.92 
0.72 
0.58 
•p 
4=' 
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well as a number of continuous variables (linear 
combinations of HFF error and latency and latencies on the 
ADM). Typically in research studies of 
fast/inaccurates-slow/accurates (traditionally labeled 
impulsives or reflectives), the continuous variables of 
latency and error are dichotomized by a median split 
procedure. Subjects are classified as either 
fast/inaccurate or slow/accurate, based upon performance on 
the Hatching Familiar Figures task, a loss of information, 
thus of power in one's statistical analyses, is a 
concomitant of such a dichotomization (Ault, Mitchell, and 
Hartmann, 1976). A continuous variable, originally having 
a range of essentially infinitely many values, now only has 
at most four values (e.g. fast/inaccurate, slow/accurate, 
fast/accurate, slcv/inaccnrate)^ Although Kerlinger and 
Pedhazur (1973) state that designs can be conceptualized 
utilizing such a technique, to analyze the problem in such 
a manner leads to inaccuracies because of this sacrificed 
information. Tested relationships may fail to be of 
significance when in actuality they are significant beyond 
a chance level (a Type 2 error). Use of a multiple 
regression procedure allows errors and latency (or their 
linear combinations) to be analyzed more accurately as 
continuous variables, thereby avoiding placement of 
subjects in discrete groups. Such a design enables 
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different kinds of variables (classification and 
continuous) to be handled with equal power (Kerlinger and 
Pedhazur, 1973). 
In place of using the basic variables, HFF error and 
latency, as predictors of the dependent measure, two linear 
ccBbinations of error and latency were developed and 
entered into a regression equation. The rationale for 
using this technique lies in the observation that the 
cognitive style diaension, slow/accuracy-fast/inaccuracy, 
is not adequately determined by MFF latency alone nor by 
error alone. However, error and latency in combination 
would allow for a finer grained analysis than does the 
method of grouping people in one or another category based 
upon raw latency and error scores. Conceptually, 
individuals aie considered to vary along a continuas 
dealing with this aspect of cognitive style, more or less 
reflective, for example. Such a procedure of assigning an 
individual a score on a continuum of values is more 
congruent with the dimension of 
fast/inaccuracy-slow/accuracy than is a dichotomization 
procedure. Thus a linear combination of both error and 
latency (i.e. a single continuous variable) was generated 
for the purpose of more directly and elegantly dealing with 
this stylistic dimension. 
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This first combination generated was the weighted 
difference between the error (£) and latency(L) scores, 
termed DIFF: E - (sERR/sLAT)»L. The weighting factor, 
(sERR/sLAT), was the ratio of the standard deviations of 
error and latency in this sample and was included in order 
to equalize the contribution of both variables to the 
composite. Such a weighting system was consistent with 
much of the literature in this area of cognitive style 
which considers error and latency to be equally important 
when determining fast/inaccurate or slow/accurate 
orientations. Thus, this system of weighting allowed for 
such a balance between these two values. If an individual 
had both a high error score and a low average latency, the 
resultant linear combination would be high. This is 
comparable tc performance commonly termed fast/inaccurate. 
An individual with high latency and low error scores (i.e. 
slow/accurates) would have a low score. This linear 
combination could be considered analogous to the quadrants 
referred to as slow/accuracy-fast/inaccuracy 
(reflection-impulsivity) in the traditional 
dichotomizaticn procedure. However, it is a more accurate 
indication of an individual's style than that provided by a 
median split procedure. 
A second linear combination (labeled SUH) was the 
addition of similarly weighted error and latency scores on 
U8 
the HFF; E + (sEBE/sLàT)»L. In this case, high values 
indicated that many errors sere aade but also that 
responding vas slow. Such performance would suggest that 
the individual had difficulty with the task or displayed 
incompetency. A low score reflects a fast/accurate 
orientation, or a competency aspect of his/her performance. 
SDH scores are likened to the off-guadrants of the typical 
dichotomizaticn procedure (slow/inaccurate-fast/accurate) 
in this area of research. These aspects of BFF performance 
have been essentially ignored in the literature. Scores on 
this dimension would place an individual along such a 
competence-incompetence continuum, unconfounded with the 
cognitive style dimension under consideration in this 
study. The weighting factor which gave egual contribution 
tc error and latency also ensured that these tso linear 
combinations were orthogonal. Therefore, as a result of 
forming these linear combinations, an ability dimension and 
a stylistic performance (fast/inaccurate-slow/accurate) 
dimension were teased apart and then separately analyzed. 
These continuous variables were included as predictors of 
the dependent variable in regression analyses. 
A correlation matrix was computed for the predictor 
variables and the dependent measure involved in this study. 
Predictor variables were presentation mode, instructions, 
grade, and performance on the MFF task and the ADM. The 
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measures significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable were presentation mode (r = .29, £<.CC8) and SUM 
(r = .28, 2<.01). No correlations of the dependent measure 
with MFF error, MFF latency, DIFF, nor performance on the 
ADM approached a significant level. These correlations are 
presented in Table 2. Means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 3. 
Used as predictors of the dependent variable (average 
number of trials to criterion) in the first regression 
analysis were the classification variables and their 
interactions as well as three continuous variables, DIFF, 
SUB, ADM performance, and all interactions of DIFF with 
presentation mode, instructions, and grade level. Mode of 
presentation of the concepts was found to be significant, 
F(1.62) = 4.15. D<,Ou, The condition in which subjects 
controlled stimulus choice (selection) yielded fewer trials 
to criterion than did a reception condition. The means for 
the selection and reception conditions were 7.25 and 9.72, 
respectively. The linear combination labeled SDM 
approached significance, F (1,62) = 3.08, £<.08, suggesting 
the possibility that position on this dimension of speed 
and accuracy may be a predictor of the dependent variable. 
No main effects for other classification variables, nor for 
DIFF were significant. Also, no interactions of DIFF with 
the other variables approached significance. A summary 
TABLE 2 
Correliiticn Coefficients 
(A) (B) (C) (0) (E) (P) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) 
Presentation (A) 1.00 0.00 
Instructions (B) 1.00 
Grade (C) 
MFF Error (D) 
MFF Latency (E) 
ADM A (F) 
AD M B (G) 
ADM C (H) 
Ave. # Trials 
to Criterion(I) 
DIFF (J) 
SUM (K) 
0.02 0 .15 -.06 .01 -.04 .18 .28* -. 12 . 12 
.00 -.04 .09 -.14 -.02 -.07 .13 .07 .06 
1,00 .05 -.19 -.30* -.29* -.34* -. 06 -.13 -.17 
1 .00 — .66* .09 .04 .15 .16 -.91* .41* 
1.00 .11 .06 .07 .06 .91* .41* 
1.00 .41* .40* .12 .01 .25* 
1.00 .33* .08 .01 . 13 
1.00 .20 -.04 .26* 
•
 
o
 
o
 
-.05 .28* 
1.00 .00 
1.00 
»£<.01 
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TAPLP 3 
Average Number of Trials to Criterion for Each Condition 
GRADE U 
1)Selection - No Instructions: 7,72 
2)Selection - Instructions; 7.34 
3)Reception - No Instructions; 9.87 
4)Reception - Instructions: 10.27 
GRADE 6 
1)Selection - No Instructions; 6.72 
2)Selection - Instructions; 7.20 
3)Reception - No Instructions; 7.51 
4)Reception - Instructions: 11,31 
Means and Standard Deviations for Other Variables 
MFF Error 
RFP Latency 
ADMA(first 1/3 ADM) 
ADHB(second 1/3 ADM) 
ADHC(last 1/3 ADM) 
Average Number cf 
Trials to criterion 
DIFF 
SUM 
6,30 
15 = 33 
4.12 
4.94 
3.87 
4.34 
7.09 
1.50 
1.57 
1.57 
8.51 
0.37 
1,04 
4.34 
12.93 
5.82 
JABLE_J} 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Dependent Variable: 
Ave, I of; Trials to Criterion 
— 
Source M Sum of Squares Mean_Sauare I R-Square 
Regression 19 368.42 19.39 1.04 0.24 
Error 62 1157.43 18.67 
Corrected Total 81 1525.85 
Partial 
Source Sum .o^Sguares I 
Presentation Mode 1 77.54 4.15+^ 
Instructions 1 21.91 1.17 
Grade 1 0.52 0.03 
Presantation X Instructions 1 38.16 2.04 
Presentation X Grade 1 3.14 0. 17 
Instructions X Grade 1 14.98 0.80 
Presentation X Instructions X Grade 1 4.23 0.23 
DIFF 1 2. 12 0. 11 
SDM 1 57.65 3.09+ 
ADMA (First 1/3 of ADM) 1 1.05 0. 06 
ADME (Second 1/3 of ADM) 1 0.00 0.00 
ADMC (Last 1/3 of ADM) 1 7. 16 0. 38 
Presentation X DIFF 1 0.33 0.02 
Instructions X DIFF 1 5.03 0.27 
Grade X DIFF 1 3.71 0.20 
Presentation X Instructions X DIFF 1 2.49 0. 13 
Presentation X Grade X DIFF 1 1.98 0.11 
Instructions X Grade X DIFF 1 7.05 0.38 
Presentation X Instructions X Grade X DIFF 1 5.67 0.30 
•£<.10 
••£<.05 
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table of these results is shown in Table 4. 
Strategies used by sabiects in the selection condition 
Because subjects in the selection conditions were 
responsible for choosing the concept instances themselves, 
it was possible to delineate the actual strategy used by 
them when learning the concepts. For these subjects, the 
number of times a focusing approach was employed was 
recorded for the eight trials. This was analyzed in a 
multiple regression analysis with instructions, grade, 
DIFF, SDN, and interactions entered as predictors of the 
new dependent variable, number of focusing responses. This 
analysis would determine whether or not the particular 
strategy used was influenced by instructions given or by 
other subject characteristics. No significance was 
obtained in this analysis as can be seen in the summary 
table shown in Table 5- Regardless of treatment condition, 
grade level, cr cognitive style, approximately equivalent 
numbers of focusing strategies were used in the concept 
task. 
Relationship between HFF and ADM performance 
Performance on the attention task, the ADM, was 
divided into thirds. Average time to locate each number 
for each third of the task was recorded and correlated with 
performance on the HFF (i.e. latencies and errors). The 
results indicated that latencies on the ADM did not 
TABLE 5 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Dependent Variable: 
Focusing Strategy Osage 
Source 
Regression 
Error 
M 
8 
31 
0.98 
1.91 
F 
84 
B-Square 
.117 
Corrected Total 39 
^içe 
Instruct ions 
Grade 
Instructions X Grade 
DIFF 
SOM 
Instructions X DIFF 
Grade X DIFF 
Instructions X Grade X DIFF 
1 0.63 0.33 
1 0.25 0.01 
1 0.25 0.01 
1 0.01 0.01 
1 0.53 0.28 
1 0.12 0.06 
1 5.28 2.77 
26 0 .66  
55 
correlate significantly with BFF latencies, errors, or with 
the linear combinations, DIFF and SUM. Thus, rate of 
responding on this measure of attention was not related to 
latency of response on the HFF, nor with accuracy of 
performance. These correlations are shown in Table 2. 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of this study did not support the 
hypotheses initially presented. None of the principal 
hypotheses concerning the relationship of the cognitive 
style dimension of fast/inaccuracy-slow/accuracy to 
performance on the concept formation task were 
substantiated. The major hypotheses follow as do the 
findings obtained from data analyses relating to these 
predictions. 
Presentation nodes: Selection versus reception 
Variation in the manner by which concept instances 
were presented to the subjects was included in the design 
to shed light on some of the differing results found in the 
literature. Huttenlocher (1962) observed that reception 
c S» 1 1 /M» 0/^   ^vol Tf Ô vôaT» n 
performance on a concept solving task than did a selection 
paradigm. With adults. Hunt (1965) found that quicker 
concept attainment occured when subjects selected their own 
concept instances. In this study, age levels not 
previously tested (nine and eleven years) were included in 
order to determine whether a selection condition is 
facilitative only for adults and that children use 
information obtained from a reception procedure more 
efficiently than from a selection condition. 
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Results indicated that a selection paradigm yielded 
significantly fewer average trials to criterion than a 
reception mode. This parallels the previous findings 
dealing with adult performance on concept acquisition 
(Hunt, 1965). It appears that by the time an individual is 
in the fourth grade, he/she is more proficient at forming 
concepts when allowed to freely choose the concept 
instances to be tested than when the experimenter presents 
these instances. This contradicts Huttenlocher's (1962) 
findings that indicated that twelve year olds perform 
better when presented instances of the concepts. However, 
the task reguirements in the two experiments were not 
identical, nor were the concepts to be learned. 
Instructions varied and the mode of presenting concepts was 
dissimilar. The individual vas shcsr. actual objects and 
not simply pictorial representations of geometric figures 
as in the present study. Such task differences may have 
produced these discrepant findings. If there is an age at 
which reception modes are more beneficial than selection 
procedures, results of this study did not indicate when 
that would be. No research exists which directly compares 
young children (seven to eight years) with older age 
groupings. Therefore, what may be said concerning 
presentation mode based upon present results is that a 
selection procedure facilitates performance on conjunctive 
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concepts, at least by the fourth grade level. 
Possible reasons for the beneficial effect of 
selection conditions can be considered. When such a 
paradigm is employed, it is suggested that an individual is 
•forced* to increase his/her attention to the task (Bourne 
et al., 1971). This demand for attention may elicit more 
activity on the part of the subject, intensifying his/her 
involvement. An individual's motivation and orienting 
response to the task would play a role in successful task 
performance. Better performance would be produced if 
cognitively the individual is also exerting greater effort 
to obtain information when solving the problem, more effort 
than when simply receiving information as in a reception 
condition. In such a situation, a subject may actively 
r* on Q 4 oi* w k a ^ cir 4 ^ a wk 4 r-k /-a 4 w 1 r) 
him/her more quickly and accurately discover the co ,ept. 
This finding indicates that selection modes are 
advantageous to performance. Superiority of selection 
modes would also result if individuals have a difficult 
time adapting to and employing someone else*s strategies 
and prefer to use their own strategies and activities in a 
learning situation. 
In the reception paradigm, instances were presented in 
what has been considered an optimal (focusing) approach 
(Laughlin, 1975) . when such a strategy is employed. 
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sufficient information to determine the concept is gathered 
in the fewest number of trials. However, subjects did not 
benefit from receiving information in this manner in the 
present study. Even when informed initially of what 
procedure the experimenter was using (i.e. in the 
instructions condition), performance was not enhanced. 
This order of presentation may diverge too much from the 
approaches fourth and sixth graders would commonly use. If 
such an approach is not familiar to them they may not 
utilize the information efficiently and may even find it 
difficult to follow the experimenter's strategy. If 
subjects are allowed a training period, not merely 
information or instructions concerning the presentation 
order, it is possible that they would become more 
accsstozed to a focusing strategy. Such familiarity with 
this strategy could eliminate initial uncertainty 
concerning how cards are shown and therefore decrease 
trials to solution. 
No instructions versus instructions 
The hypothesis that instructions given at the 
beginning of the task would benefit the subjects was not 
upheld. Instructions informing the subjects of an 
efficient way to discover the concepts (when selecting 
their own instances) and explanations of the method of 
presenting concept instances (reception condition) had 
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negligible effect on efficiency of concept acquisition. 
Additionally, when the strategies used in selection 
conditions were analyzed, subjects given instructions did 
not focus more frequently than those receiving no 
instructions. 
Instructions thus appear to have failed to modify 
cognitive approaches and to enhance performance. The 
strategies that were more familiar to these subjects were 
possibly employed regardless of the assistance given in the 
instructions. These aids may not have been sufficiently 
descriptive of focusing behavior to guide the subjects to 
adopt such a procedure or to summarize the information 
obtained in the process. Alternatively, instructions to 
use a focusing strategy may have failed if they led to 
1. wo 11 ^ V, a LI a ^11 y u w cia/ciai Liwii vt ^y iiw JL c uiic 
focusing suggestions at the outset of the task. The 
results do not rule out the possibility that with a very 
detailed description of focusing behavior accompanied by a 
period of training, such instructions and practice could 
aid task performance. 
The cognitive style dimension of 
fast/inaccurate-slow/accurate was not related to this 
instructional manipulation as hypotheses predicted. Sola 
and Phye (1976) found that fast/inaccurates did 
significantly better at item recall on a classification 
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task when told to use a particular strategy than when left 
to their own devices. Slow/accurates, on the other hand, 
did better without strategy instructions. Contrary to the 
hypothesis based upon this finding, individuals who tended 
to be more fast and inaccurate did not benefit from 
instructions to use a focusing approach more than did 
slow/accurates. Subjects in both conditions tended to use 
scanning strategy for approximately six of the eight 
concepts. Lack of a relationship between this dimension of 
cognitive style to the instructions condition may be in 
part related to the earlier cited criticisms of the 
incompleteness or confusing nature of these instructions. 
Any potential instructional effect interacting with 
cognitive style may have been eliminated by an ineffective 
experimental manipulation. 
Grade differences 
ncKinney's (1975) research indicated that 
developmental differences appear on problem solving tasks 
at the ages included in the present study. In particular, 
between nine and eleven years of age, slow/accurates showed 
a pattern of continued improvement while fast/inaccurates 
showed little or no gain in problem solving efficiency. In 
this study, the hypothesis based upon these findings 
concerning performance differences of fourth and sixth 
graders was net upheld. Their criterion performance was 
62 
comparable in all experimental conditions. Also, older 
subjects in selection conditions did not use more focusing 
strategies in the task than the younger subjects. It 
appears that individuals at these age levels have similar 
levels of attention and orienting as well as comperable 
strategies, all of which are reflected in such concept 
formation tasks. It may have been necessary to use a wider 
age range in order that performance differences could 
emerge. Addition of a third age level (i.e. second 
graders) may have yielded more information on this matter, 
allowing for greater developmental variability in cognitive 
abilities. 
Relationship of cognitive style to task performance 
Contrary to the hypotheses, this dimension of 
cognitive style (fast/inaccurate-slow/accurate performance) 
was not related to the number of trials to criterion on the 
concept formation task developed for this study. 
Predictions were that fast/inaccurate individuals would 
reguire more trials than slow/accurates in the process of 
concept acguisition. Such results were expected if less 
well-developed strategies were characteristic of those who 
are more inaccurate and quicker in responding. Focusing 
strategies have been found to reduce the number of trials 
to solution in a variety of tasks (HcKinney, 1975). If the 
literature is correct in stating that fast/inaccurate 
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individuals are less analytic, do not survey the entire 
stimulus situation, and do not consider alternative 
solutions to a task (Kagan et al., 1966; Drake, 1970; 
Egeland, 1975), one would expect that strategies which 
efficiently use information obtained would be less likely 
to develop or would be slower in developing (McKinney, 
1975; Laughlin, 1975). However, no performance differences 
related to cognitive style were obtained either when 
considering the average number of trials tc criterion as 
the dependent variable or when actually analyzing the 
strategies used. 
Developmentally, the hypothesis was that a younger 
(fourth grade) individual who could be characterized by the 
HFF as slow and accurate in orientation would perform with 
accuracy sisilar to a sixth grader who rapidly responds yet 
is inaccurate. No relationship was observed between DIFF, 
age, and task performance which would uphold this 
hypothesis. Also, no support was given the hypothesis that 
fast/inaccurate subjects would perform better under a 
reception paradigm than in a selection situation. 
Additionally, the experimental manipulation of adding 
instructions to correct the hypothesized immature 
strategies did not decrease the number of trials to 
criterion nor increase focusing. If these experimentally 
imposed manipulations add structure or support, predictions 
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were that an individual using less developed cognitive 
strategies would have displayed increased efficiency when 
compared with others who already may use effective manners 
of surveying the task and obtaining information. None of 
these suggestions was supported, when strategies were also 
considered, results did not substantiate the prediction 
that individuals of a fast/inaccurate orientation actually 
do have less developed, inefficient cognitive strategies 
than other subjects. 
Prior to rejecting these hypotheses in total, however, 
the experimental task must be scrutinized. McKinney (1975) 
found that with too easy or with overly difficult tasks, no 
differences in performance occurred in those individuals of 
different cognitive styles. The lower variance of these 
experimental groups. Literature in this area does not give 
an indication of the level of task difficulty that would be 
optimal for one to obtain differential performance on the 
part of those who are quite fast and inaccurate and those 
whose orientation is slow/accurate. A route for further 
research could include varying levels of task difficulty 
while employing the same stimulus materials and procedures, 
e.g. a concept formation task with concepts defined by both 
two and three relevant attributes. This may give an 
indication of the point at which the level of difficulty is 
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too low or becomes too great to allow for performance 
differences between those of divergent cognitive styles. 
Another task consideration would be that the task was 
•unusual* enough so that subjects may not have employed the 
same strategies they use in typical educational settings. 
Non-geometric figures and concepts are the rule in everyday 
situations, whereas those used in this task were uncommon 
concepts. The contrived experimental method may have 
elicited strategies that were not representative of their 
usual manners of learning. Slow/accurates and 
fast/inaccurates may have performed alike, yet not using 
their typical approaches to a new stimulus situation. 
Also, the experimental task presented the concept instances 
in a highly organized fashion, not in the way concept 
instances are normally presented to an individual. A 
randomized presentation order may elicit differential 
strategies in individuals of varied cognitive styles or 
grade levels. 
HFF performance and the ADM (attentional) measure 
The idea presented at the outset of this study that 
people whose orientation tends towards a fast and 
inaccurate style are 'plagued* with attentional 
deficiencies was considered. None of the findings of this 
study support this suggestion. One could possibly argue 
that the novelty of the experimental task itself uay have 
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sufficiently compensated for the suggested deficiencies in 
attention, reducing the performance differences between 
those of varying positions on the cognitive style 
dimension. However, this notion that there are actual 
attentional differences may be called into question. 
Considering ADM performance, no correlation was found 
between latency on this measure and latency or errors on 
the HFF, nor with their linear combinations, DIFF and SDH. 
Analysis of the relationship between the 
fast/inaccurate-slow/accurate dimension and ADM 
performance leads one to question these suggestions of 
different attentional patterns, since no relationship 
appeared. The possibility does exist, however, that 
another more direct and sensitive measure of attention may 
reveal différences between individuals cf various cognitive 
styles. Since the ADM was a relatively brief scanning 
task, different types of attention tasks which span a 
longer period of time may allow for fast/inaccarates to 
display the suggested inability to sustain attention 
(Seiner, 1975) . 
Significance of the linear composites, DIFF and SUM 
Of interest in this study was the development of 
orthogonal linear composites based upon the subjects' MFF 
error and latency scores. Such a composite allowed their 
scores to remain on a continuous scale, retaining accuracy 
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and avoiding the loss of information which occurs when 
dichotomizing data. This dichotomization is the 
traditional practice with respect to cognitive style, 
fast/inaccuracy-slow/accuracy. Using these linear 
composites, values along the DIFF and SDH dimensions are 
obtained by all individuals and no classification is 
involved. Such a procedure eliminates the possibility of 
misclassification or changes in classification upon 
retesting. For instance, Egeland and Weinberg (1976) 
studied the credibility of the HFF test and found that 2 0 %  
of those subjects designated as reflective (slow/accurate) 
and 50% of the impulsive (fast/inaccurate) subjects changed 
classification at a second testing. Based upon their 
observations, suggestions dealing with the creation of 
xinsar ccspcsitss of error and time were presented. Such a 
procedure creates a composite which is mere reliable than 
are error and latency independently. This composite is 
more reliable (reliability = .61) only with respect to 
DIFF, however, since it is actually a summation and not a 
difference score. SUM, on the other hand, does not share 
in this increased reliability. This technique also allows 
for the use of multiple regression analyses, which were 
performed in the present study. As was previously 
mentioned, accuracy is increased with respect to the 
statistical analyses when classification in discrete 
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categories is avoided. 
Forming linear composites of error and latency allowed 
for the creation of two components of HFF performance, 
labeled DIFF and SUM. Individual analyses of these two 
aspects of an individual's BFF performance, his/her task 
competency as well as the primary consideration, his/her 
stylistic orientation, could then be conducted. Results of 
the present study found no relationship between one's 
cognitive style or task orientation 
(fast/inaccuracy-slow/accuracy) and concept formation 
efficiency nor with the strategies used while solving the 
experimental problem. Equivocal results of previous 
studies regarding the relationship of cognitive style and a 
variety of cognitive tasks may have resulted from 
unreliability produced by dichotozizing îîFF data^ The 
present technique of creating linear composites may be used 
in future research studies in this area, eliminating the 
statistical problems plaguing present research analyses. 
The linear combination termed SUM waô the sole aspect 
of MFF performance found to be marginally related to 
efficiency on the concept formation task. This aspect of a 
subject's abilities was considered comparable to a 
cc&petency aspect of an individual's cognitive behavior, 
rather than the stylistic orientation. Comparison of this 
aspect of an individual's performance with general 
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intellectual abilities (such as IQ) is necessary. If there 
is a relationship, interpretation of findings dealing with 
SOU may become easier and clearer. If this dimension, 
orthogonal to DIFP, does represent a person's general 
ability, then separate and independent analyses of two 
aspects of one's behavior, as measured by the BFF, can be 
made. This seems a viable direction to pursue with respect 
to cognitive style research. 
Considering the criticisms of the experimental task, 
it would be difficult to conclusively state that the 
hypotheses made at the outset of this study with respect to 
cognitive styles are totally incorrect. In any case, the 
overall absence of a relationship between this dimension of 
cognitive style and task performance and the lack of effect 
«3 ^ ^  t ^ *#3 f a c WA v" A VX CI ^  L, W V 1* <C W W.  ^  ^VA  ^w «-• » 'W te  ^ ** X  ^w «•> «A w -m. a. s.» 
to relate to cognitive style) is puzzling. One 
consideration is the generalizability of this dimension as 
measured by the MFF to a task such as was employed in the 
present study. This dimension may remain a characteristic 
of performance found only on perceptual matching tasks. 
Block, Block, and Harrington (1974) suggest that generality 
of MFF performance is within a rather narrow class of 
cognitive tasks. On a concept formation task, then, there 
may be no relationship between observed MFF performance and 
efficiency of concept acguisition. Such limited value of 
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the resultant MFF scores needs to be scrutinized in the 
future. An additional area requiring exploration is the 
creation and use of linear composites based upon MFF 
scores. The potential increase in accuracy regarding 
cognitive style will allow greater precision with respect 
to the research analyses and fewer equivocal results 
concerning the importance of cognitive style for an 
individual. 
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APPEHDIX A: 
CONCEPT INFORMATION 
Concepts to be solved and the order of presentation in the 
concept-formation task: 
1) Large Circles 
2) Bed Crosses 
3) Two Squares 
4) Three large objects 
5) Green Squares 
6) Medium-sized Blue objects 
7) One Red object 
8) Three small objects 
Order of difficulty of the concepts and average number of 
trials to criterion for each concept; 
1) Three small objects - 5.80 
2) Green Squares - 6.30 
3) Red Crosses - 7.25 
4) Large Circles - 8.50 
5) Three large objects — 9.10 
6) Two Squares - 9.30 
7) One Red object - 9.95 
8) Medium Blue objects - 12.50 
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APPENDIX B: 
IMSIBOCTIOHS 
General instructions - given to all subjects in all 
conditions 
"For this task I will have you figure out what it is I 
am thinking of. I will have in mind a particular concept 
which you are to guess. A concept is a way of grouping 
these cards in ways in which they are alike. For example, 
*dog* is a concept. Many animals which look different in 
some ways but which are alike in other ways can be called 
•dogs*. In what ways are dogs alike?" (A response was 
asked for. If none was given, help was allowed.) "In this 
game the concepts are somewhat different, however. The 
concept may be 'all red cards* or 'all cards with blue 
crosses- or 'all cards with two medium-sized objects'." 
(The subjects were given these concepts and were required 
to point to those cards which were examples of the given 
concept to insure understanding of the term concept as used 
in this task.) "The objects can change in four different 
ways. The color can change, so can the shape. The number 
on each card can change as well as the size of each object. 
The color can be red, green, or blue. Objects can be 
small, medium, or large and they can be squares, circles, 
or crosses. Also, there can be one, two, or three objects 
per card. Any combination cf two of these characteristics 
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names my concept. For example, the concept may be blue 
crosses, what is that a combination of?" (Subjects then 
responded. If there was any difficulty, instructions were 
elaborated on in order to clarify and another example 
given.) "That is right, the color blue and the shape cross 
names my concept." 
Instructions added for the subjects in a selection 
condition 
"I will start you off by pointing to a card which is 
an example of the concept I am thinking of. Then you are 
to pick cards, one at a time, which you think may be 
examples of my concept. You will point to each card and 
then I will tell you if that is or is not an example of my 
concept. Continue to point to cards that you think are 
examples of the concept I have in mind until I tell you to 
stop. When I think that you know the concept, I will ask 
you what concept I am thinking about. In that way I will 
know that you have figured cut the concept." 
Instructions added for the subjects in a reception 
condition 
"I will begin by pointing to a card which is an 
example of the concept I am thinking of. Then I will point 
to cards one at a time, and you are to tell me whether you 
think that they are examples of my concept. I will then 
tell you if your guess is correct. As I continue to point 
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to cards, you will say if they are or are not examples of 
my concept. This will continue until I think that you know 
what it is I am thinking of. I will stop you and ask you 
what you think the concept is. In that way I will know 
that you have figured out the concept." 
additional focusing instructions for a selection paradigm 
"I will give you a hint how to go about this task. 
When I show you a card that is an example of the concept I 
am thinking of, keep it in mind. Change only one aspect 
(characteristic/part) of the next choice, and do this on 
each choice that you make. For example, say that I point 
to two large red squares and say that this card is an 
example of my concept. Yov could then point to another 
card that is almost the same, but which changes in one way. 
That is, the next card aay be three large red squares. 
This changes only in the number of objects on the card. If 
I say 'Yes, this too is an example*, compare this card with 
the card I showed to you at the beginning (i.e., two large 
red squares). Since the number of objects is the only 
thing that is different on the two cards and since both are 
examples of my concept, you can figure out that number is 
not part of my concept. You may then pick another card 
that changes in only one other way for example, two small 
red squares. This changes only in size (the new one is 
small, the focus was large). If I say that this is not an 
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example, then you will know that size (large) must be 
important - that is, it must be part of my concept. 
Continue like this until I am certain that you know the 
concept I have in mind." (Another example was given as 
practice and to insure understanding.) 
Additional focusing instructions for the reception 
paradigm 
"I will give you a hint how to go about this task. 
When I show you a card that is an example of the concept I 
am thinking of, keep it in mind. I will then change only 
one aspect (characteristic/part) of the next card I point 
to and will do this on each choice that I make. For 
example, say that I point to two large red squares and say 
that this card is an example of my concept. I would then 
point to ancthec card that is almost the same, but which 
changes in only one way from the focus card. That is, the 
next card may be three large red squares. This changes 
only in the number of objects on the card. If I say that 
this too is an example, then compare this card with the 
card I indicated to jou at the start (i.e., two large red 
squares). Since the number is the only thing that is 
different on the two cards and since both are examples of 
my concept, you can figure cut that number is not a part of 
my concept. The next card will change in only one other 
way - for example, two small red squares. This changes 
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only in size - the new one is small, the focus was large. 
If 1 say that this is not an example, then you will know 
that size (large) must be important, that is, it must be 
part of my concept. I will continue like this until I am 
certain that you know the concept I have in mind." 
(Another example was given as practice and to insure 
understanding.) 
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